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From Human Rights to Humanity’s Law

The Current State of Play
Ruti G. Teitel

1

Introduction

What turns on the current narratives regarding the fields of human rights and
humanitarianism? My contribution will attempt to sort through what is at stake here on
account of the broader questions that animate this volume.
My argument is that the legal regimes represented by human rights, on the one hand,
and humanitarianism, on the other have become less autonomous and distinct in recent
decades with consequences for an understanding of human rights in the short run. My
book on the topic entitled Humanity’s Law1 argued that for a number of reasons there had
been a move towards humanity-based arguments and normative approaches in international
legal and political discourse. In brief, political changes had weakened the state and produced
conditions of humanitarian need and related demands in many places. This account
predated the ‘populist’ turn we associate with the current moment and its complicated
implications for human rights and their protection. Below, I address some of the resulting
challenges.

2

2.1

Human Rights: Multiple Regimes and Discourses

Sensing Change

Two decades on since the immediate post-Cold War period it is widely conceded that
there has been a remarkable shift from the view of human rights as a progressive narrative
in the 1990s to the view – post-9/11 – of a threatened and diminished regime. One might
characterize the ascendant view as a pessimistic or skeptical account of the human rights
regime.2 On this view, the setbacks for human rights in the post-9/11, war on terror era,
intensified by the new populism on the right justify declaring an ‘end’ of the human rights
1
2

R.G. Teitel, Humanity’s Law, Oxford. (2011).
See Teitel, 2011 for some illustrations. Also K. Sikkink, Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work for
the 21st Century, Princeton. (2017).
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revolution, a permanent downward adjustment of the hopes for human rights towards a
minimum.
A basic question here is what the standards – and parameters – for judgment are? For
example, is one charting the rise and fall of a form of discourse, or measuring the
functionality and impact of positive legal norms on the ground? The idea of the rights of
man or humankind has vied in the modern period, really since the 16th century, with other
modern meta-accounts of political and legal morality, communitarianism/nationalism,
‘political theology’ etc. The direct embodiment of human rights in positive legal norms at
the international level is a more recent phenomenon, albeit one whose pre-history could
be traced back to the humanism of Grotius or even the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics.3
Human rights have figured prominently in resistance or opposition to political and religious
orthodoxies, as much or even more than regime-founding ideologies. All of this makes a
single standard of judgment very difficult to discern. Indeed, it might lead to healthy
skepticism about whether we have arrived at a privileged historical moment where we can
appreciate the possibilities and weaknesses of human rights with some finality.
I argue below that the ‘endist’ account or narrative derives from a peculiar
characterization of human rights in historical terms, as relating to a particular genealogy,
namely, one that is a distinct set of practices or actors also related to a particular political
period: the rise of global activism based on positive international human rights norms,
and the (ostensible) incorporation of such activism as an essential aspect of the foreign
policy of established “Western” liberal democracies, extending, at the limit, the use of
economic sanctions or even the use of force in the name of human rights. My own approach
to these questions revisits the prevailing human rights phenomena and asks what to make
of what we might term here a dynamic set of normative practices. Would acknowledgment
of the redefinition of the phenomena, namely a system of relevant norms, actors and
practices inform the theorization and ongoing direction in the field?
There is a legal account and a political account; pursuing an interdisciplinary method
and dialectic attempts to hold both lenses in place simultaneously with an eye to
illuminating the status of the current approach. Recognition of both tensions and
convergences in these two regimes, practices and discourses around key contemporary
concerns points us not towards any final resolution of the fate of human rights, but instead
towards the direction of what I term ‘humanity’s law’, namely the norms surrounding a
minimum ethos of care/solidarity and a related set of demands across a globalizing world.4

3
4

See prominently Cicero, ‘On Duties’ [De Officiis]. (44 B.C.E.).
See Teitel, 2011.
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2.2

From Human Rights to Humanity’s Law

On Regimes and Discourses

For some time now, in a number of scholarly communities there have been attempts to
conduct a cross-disciplinary conversation about the status of human rights and the
relationship of human rights and humanitarianism. By far, the dominant challenge comes
from politics and law, with further insight from the vantage point of anthropology,
philosophy and history. The crucial questions at stake clearly transcend one or even two
scholarly disciplines, to a cross-disciplinary enterprise also reflected in the contributors
to this volume.
There are concerns relating to the fate of this legal regime at this time. But it is worth
starting the wide-ranging uses of key terms, often coupled with a sense that we – scholars
– are talking past each other. If there is a central question we are taking up, it concerns the
ongoing salience of human rights discourse. And what might its relation be to other regimes
and discourses addressing related normative questions that might be equally or even more
relevant in light of globalization.
To what extent can there be a shared answer to this question posed as such herein? For
some, e.g., Jeff Flynn, the divergence in understandings in great part relates to differing
terminology, and the related likelihood of misunderstanding due to interdisciplinarity and
vocabulary differences in various agendas.5 Consider that philosophers of human rights,
like John Tasioulas who aim to theorize the concept of human rights as such, which he
defines in terms of “the universal interests of human beings each and every one of whom
possesses an equal moral status arising from their common humanity.”6 For others,
historians for instance, ‘human rights’ represents the practices of a particular set of actors
at a particular time, though often these understandings have become generalized. The
scholarship of Samuel Moyn might fall into this camp.7 While for still others such as
Stephen Hopgood and Kathryn Sikkink – scholars whose work derives from their own
prior human rights activism – the focus is even more limited, zeroing in on a distinct set
of activities which are apparently related to a set of activists and concerns at particular
times, namely the 1970s, and largely regarding foreign policy in Latin America. Small
wonder there is debate about the status and direction of human rights.
These various semantic or discursive ‘framings’ – a cluster of them that overlap as to
the field of human rights – imply differing narratives about the past (i.e., their intellectual
genealogies) as well as varying views of the present, and about the nature of future
trajectories, about areas of continuities and discontinuities. The varying linguistics can

5
6
7

J. Flynn, ‘Genealogies of Human Rights’, in A. Etison (ed.), Human Rights: Moral or Political?, Oxford. 103114. (2018).
J. Tasioulas, ‘On the Foundations of Human Rights’, in R. Cruft, S. Matthew Liao & M. Renzo (eds.),
Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, Oxford. 50. (2015).
See S. Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History. Cambridge, Mass. (2011).
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result in basic misunderstandings. So when legal historian and Europeanist Martti
Koskenniemi reads Humanity’s Law, he sees a determinist progressive historical narrative
(indeed a triumphalist claim), rather than an interpretation of a particular shift in
international law and political discourse, with a related set of tensions.8
During the Cold War’s late period, human rights was indubitably part of the language
of resistance which played a role in spurring the Soviet collapse (e.g. consider Helsinki
Watch). Thereafter demand for human rights would prove, on the one hand, more
ambitious, while on the other, more problematic, since the subsequent Balkans Wars and
then Rwanda placed extreme burdens on human rights. Indeed, in the wake of the Soviet
collapse both instances reflected a new context. One could see that there was a seemingly
newfound possibility for human rights-based interventions. This apparent potential of
post-Communist military or judicial interventions would simultaneously awaken us to a
sense of its limits, foreshadowing the seeming convergence of two regimes and the related
challenge to the previous rule of law in international affairs.
The predicament of the post-Soviet era could be stated as follows. Rather than
understanding ‘human rights’ in terms of legal and constitutional rights articulated within
a nation state, explicitly modeled in such instances of systematic political violence and
persecution, it became clear that there was a human demand for protection with or without
the state. In some instances engagement with the broader transnational humanitarian
regime – whether military or judicial – was due to failed states, while in others it resulted
from lacking capacity (e.g. in the Balkans). Therefore, already in the immediate post-war
period one could see the strange moment of contact between the ‘pure’ human rights
regime and the humanitarian regime: a new connection formed, as the jus ad bellum
moment converged with the human rights protection regime.
This new justificatory regime was seen by orthodox or traditionalist public international
lawyers as a serious challenge to the prevailing prohibition on the unilateral use of force
in the UN Charter (with a narrow exception for self-defense). It is at this moment that the
move to ‘amend’ began, in fact through evolutionary practice. Despite World War II
atrocities the Charter hitherto said nothing about how to reconcile protection of
self-determination with human rights. Now with Responsibility to Protect (or R2P) a new
norm started to emerge at the UN to authorize and even to legitimate transnational
humanitarian intervention. At the same time, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter itself, in
prohibiting the use of force contrary to the principles and purposes of the United Nations,

8

See my exchange together with Robert Howse with Martti Koskenniemi on Humanity’s Law: M. Koskenniemi,
‘Humanity’s Law by Ruti Teitel’, 26 Ethics and International Affairs. 395. (2012); R. L. Howse & R. Teitel,
‘Does Humanity Law Require (or Imply) a Progressive Theory of History? (And Other Questions for Martti
Koskenniemi)’, 27 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal. 377. (2013) and R. Teitel, ‘A Response
to Martti Koskenniemi’s Review of Humanity’s Law’, 27 Ethics and International Affairs. 233. (2013).
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left the door open to a teleological interpretation that would distinguish interventions to
vindicate those principles and purposes from absolutely prohibited uses of force.
What did it mean? The demand for this new protective principle’s application would
occur quickly in yet another moment of political flux, the ‘Arab Spring’. Once again, the
demand for human rights based foreign affairs would recur, this time in Libya. By now,
with the R2P discourse and a Security Council authorizing vote, there was the hitherto
unheard maximum political support for and legal authorization of ‘humanitarian
intervention’ with even Russia and China going along with the Security Council vote
authorizing intervention all in all. Yet, shortly thereafter the Coalition’s actions were
interpreted after the fact as ‘regime change’ and thus began a strong reaction against the
notion of transnational humanitarian intervention. The case for military action in the
name of human rights no doubt was a hard one.
One may simply question whether contemporary human rights practices, in general,
presuppose or require some sort of Whig philosophy of history (even if that is the implicit
worldview of some of the practitioners), an issue that Rob Howse and I have raised in our
critical engagement with Martti Koskenniemi.9 Together with Moyn, one can see that
taking the progressive side could easily characterize the present situation as the final gasps
of the ancien régime, as it tries to strike back, or as an interregnum of ‘restoration’. Moyn
often recalls the apparent looming gap between the idealistic view of human rights and
the state of current practice:10 “the human rights moment, like the world it monitors, is in
crisis.”11 But one wonders, if this ‘endist’ account can tell us, in his words, “enough?” Isn’t
it an odd critique that the form taken by contemporary human rights practices is no longer
the same as three decades back? At best, this can be understood as an argument about the
proper interpretation of the past role of human rights regime and, in particular, a strain
of wrongheaded triumphalism. Yet, this account cannot begin to adequately explain the
present politics of human rights with all its complexities.

3

3.1

Backslide, Backlash, Boomerang or Bricolage?

Globalization and Its Implications for the Traditional Human Rights
Model

My approach here is interpretive, such as in Humanity’s Law. There I aimed to show that
the human rights movement and its evolving connection to the humanitarian regime

9
10
11

See Howse & Teitel, 2013, 377.
See S. Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World, Cambridge, Mass. (2018).
See S. Moyn, ‘How the Human Rights Movement Failed’, The New York Times. 23 April 2018.
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derived from a distinct political context, post-Arab Spring and in globalization with its
political and economic challenges. As is elaborated below, my argument is that human
rights function in almost all relevant situations in relation to politics, despite what might
transpire from certain simplistic legalist or moralist narratives of human rights as pure
higher law. Even Kant, however, thought that when it was a matter of cosmopolitan right
being realized, this would occur through war, trade and bargaining among sovereigns. It
is in this sense that we are talking about a discourse or discourses of human rights, and
their significance in politics.
Therefore, I aim to get beyond the judgments of the human rights regime abstracted
from political context which seem to be all too common in the current moment. Perhaps
more modestly, staying closer to the phenomena, I would like to urge a close look at
contemporary practices in terms of the kind of meanings they create or shape, in law, but
also in politics, and focus on what these observations might suggest in pointing us to a
new framing going forward.
Human rights retain considerable normative power, the power to construct meanings.
But these meanings and the effects that relate to them are multiple, and we may need more
than one lens from several disciplines to evaluate them in any kind of comprehensive way.
Suffice it to say that in many areas human rights norms inform core understandings of
accountability and rule of law, from areas of sovereign debt to smart sanctions enforced
against country leaders with significant consequences, to political mobilization particularly
with respect to religious freedom as well as gender and sexuality rights, starting from Saudi
Arabia (regarding women’s rights) to Ireland to Poland to Argentina and Chile protecting
reproductive freedom rights, or Chechnya (rights discourse in mobilization against
discrimination against gays and lesbians). The point is that – despite naysayers – there are
many instances where the normative discourse of human rights is used and is effective: it
is having an impact for greater accountability and liberalization.
Have there been changes since the 1990s? Yes, but this involves a more granular
examination of the human rights discourse in its context. Consider what might such an
examination tell us. It reveals a number of changes, in part relating to the ambit of the
human rights field and its relation to politics. Rather than understanding human rights as
it had been in largely legal and constitutional rights, as a strategy of limiting power of the
state (indeed explicitly modeled as such), what we see today in light of recurring and
systematic political violence and persecution, is that there is a human demand for
protection, beyond constitutional rights, with or without the state. Indeed, one might
characterize it as ‘human rights of foreign affairs’.
Already immediately after the Cold War, as discussed above, one could see the
transformation of the traditional human rights regime associated with the state to a new
connection, at least in the potential with the humanitarian regime: the jus ad bellum
moment converged with and has become transformed by a new justification couched in
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terms of demands for human rights protection. This new justificatory discourse was seen
as a serious challenge by some to existing international rule of law, which was informed
by the post-World War II security system via establishment of the UN Security Council,
the UN Charter, and its prohibition on intervention (other than for self-defense). So began
the move to supplement the Charter with the Responsibility to Protect.12
What are these changes in brief? First, the Cold War’s end and related geo-political
changes associated with the Soviet Bloc’s collapse triggered a move away from certain
established post-World War II power-sharing arrangements. Next, in the domain of
socio-economic rights traditionally associated with the state, globalization and its
unfoldings, and a related technological revolution are now underway. One can clearly see
power shifts beyond the state to private actors, often transnational ones, complexifying
the basis for political action and for human security. It follows that human rights values
and practices are increasingly justified in foreign policy terms.
These developments predicate and reflect change in the traditional human rights
paradigm which will be taken up below. Here it bears remembering that the fact of
significant contestation as to human rights hardly points to ‘endism’, i.e., whether we are
indeed living through yet another cycle of ‘endings’, reminiscent of Francis Fukuyama’s
post-Cold War putative ‘end of history’.13 Rather – to the contrary – we witness the ongoing
purchase of the core human rights idea. Like that earlier claim, this judgment is also too
conclusory and somehow seems the wrong interpretation of the valence of human rights
in the current moment. Instead, it is necessary to understand how the discourse is now
being used.
For what we are experiencing is not the end of the discourse of human rights. Tout au
contraire: we can see that in the current moment human rights normativity is hardly
irrelevant, rather it seems to be a galvanizing object of attack. In some political movements
(or in the case of some political leaders) the discourse or regime of “human rights” has
become an enemy that unites certain sorts of resentments in domestic politics. This is
particularly so in places of not yet consolidated transition (e.g., in Orbán’s Hungary, Putin’s
Russia), but also in Trump’s America. Consider what these leaders represent: a response
to human rights, as associated either ideologically or sociologically with a putative global
elite. They depict human rights as something external imposed from outside the state,
whether by the EU and/or by global civil society.14 Yet, as discussed below these are largely
misrepresentations, caricatures of one dimension of human rights associated with

12

13
14

See on R2P: Secretary-General of the United Nations, ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’,
Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565,
2 December 2004.
See Moyn versus Sikkink.
See K. Roth, The Dangerous Rise of Populism: Global Attacks on Human Rights Values, (2017). Available at
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/dangerous-rise-of-populism.
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globalization – namely a challenge to certain outside actors or institutions as if they were
representative of human rights in general.
Indeed, the caricature of human rights as coming from an outside global elite – the
so-called ‘Human Rights movement’ – is one that animates odd bedfellows from polar
political extremes: it animates nationalist opposition, as well as a certain strain of critical
scholarship from the left. Frankly, this caricature seems a distortion of the language and
operation of human rights: it appears to conflate human rights with a particular moment,
namely the 1990s ‘human rights as foreign affairs’ moment, where human rights discourse
for a brief period was associated with interventionist foreign policy. Yet, one that appeared
honored in the breach, as it was highly selective and hence vulnerable from the perspective
of legitimacy. State foreign affairs policies are a product of multiple interests and, therefore,
even well-intentioned human rights do not always gain the upper hand. Indeed, these
dilemmas of intervention are among the hardest.15

3.2

The Challenge to a Human Rights Beyond the State

Why is this the characterization of the current moment? What changes are underway?
Below I identify and analyze current challenges to the human rights regime. To begin, as
a general matter, human rights are largely protected legally at the level of the state. This is
reflected in human rights treaties and conventions where state parties commit to compliance
with certain norms and to related remedies, monitoring and enforcement. So from whence
the challenge of human rights beyond the state? There is currently a weak-state phenomenon
with a real impact for dilemmas for human rights enforcement. Two decades on, from the
post-1989 transitions, in many states, one can see an incomplete consolidation of democratic
institutions. This has resulted in current threats to maintaining even threshold rule of law
protection affecting human rights.
Since the 1990s, and the unauthorized NATO intervention in Kosovo, there is a related
claim that human rights is an internationalist regime, associated with strategies of external
pressures and that this normative system somehow poses a threat to state sovereignty. This
is despite the fact that the leading international and regional human rights treaties are
products of state consent and ratification. It is obvious that the primary actor in human
rights enforcement is always the state. Of course, states have varying capacities for human
rights protection, and we have seen that geo-political developments have resulted in weak
and failed states with little or no capacity for human rights enforcement. Particularly,
under such conditions, it has been important to have recourse to regional actors and related
institutions.

15

On this evolving understanding of human rights in humanitarian intervention, see Teitel, 2011, 105-138.
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Even where there is capacity there is still the matter of political will (see e.g., the ICC
complementarity principle). In addition to factoring in the nature and capacities of different
states, there are also broader geo-political developments (e.g., globalization) as a source
of malaise with an impact on the status of human rights relating to globalization, as well
as the rise of regional actors, often far from traditional communal centers. In this regard,
consider the ongoing backlash to the European Union16 and the skepticism regarding the
notion of critical economic decisions being made outside the country’s borders, hence,
‘Brexit’.
Beyond the scholarly literature, there are several related political developments, such
as the rise of blatantly nationalist leaders, for whom human rights are not irrelevant, but
depicted as an outside ‘enemy’ or enemy within (e.g., Putin, Erdogan, Orbán, Trump,
Duterte and the evident challenges to pluralism both within the state and transnationally).17
Insofar as their political rhetoric is directed against foreigners/outsiders and embraces a
nativist thread, their political values seem antithetical to the core claim of human rights,
i.e. universality and equal dignity under the law and within society. Indeed, as presently
framed, this anti-human rights argument goes to the key principle of international human
rights which relativizes any absolute understanding of national sovereignty. Consequently,
persecution or other extreme human rights abuses may well be a matter of relevance beyond
state borders.
One can see that even in staunch democracies with established rule of law systems –
situated in previously stable regions are nonetheless under threat on this very point – the
question of where to draw the normative parameters of a human rights as foreign affairs.
Consider the European Union debate over migration: With Brexit, there is a significant
possibility of the UK withdrawing from the European Court of Human Rights. Human
rights-related regionalism is under threat in many areas.
Notwithstanding the above critical assumptions, the core ‘humanitarian’ norm is hardly
predicated on a 1990s human rights culture but instead draws on much earlier humanitarian
understandings. Indeed, for one of the most longstanding accounts on the significance of
human rights values consider post-war jurist Hersch Lauterpacht. Referring to the Grotian
tradition laying the basis for principle of humanitarian intervention Lauterpacht has stated:
“[T]his is the first authoritative statement of the principle of humanitarian intervention –
the principle18 that the exclusiveness of domestic jurisdiction stops where outrage upon
humanity begins.” This was the case in the 17th century, which was followed of course, by

16
17
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On ‘backlash’ see L. Vinjamuri, ‘Human Rights Futures’, in S. Hopgood, J. Snyder & L. Vinjamuri (eds.),
Human Rights Futures, Cambridge. 114-134. (2017).
See J.-W. Mueller, What is Populism?, Philadelphia. (2016); P. Alston, ‘The Populist Challenge to Human
Rights’, 9 Journal of Human Rights Practice. 1. (2017); Roth, 2017.
See H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Groatian Tradition in International Law’, 23 British Yearbook of International
Law. 1, 46. (1946).
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the ‘Rights of Man’ animating political debate in the 18th century. It was Lauterpacht, one
of the architects of the post-World War II trials, who emphasized (deriving all the way
back from Grotius) crimes against humanity as the central norm whose prosecution justified
wartime judicial and other transnational intervention.
Given these core values can one contextualize human rights in local terms? While it is
clear that there is a centuries-old understanding of a potential politics of human solidarity,
one can take a hard look to see how human rights norms are part of domestic law, but can
also be further democratized, indigenized and reclaimed as bottom-up ideology. This is
further discussed on the following pages.

4

4.1

What Is the Challenge Posed by the Globalization of Human
Rights?

Implications for the Traditional Human Rights Account

Globalization has had an impact in many countries on economic well-being.19 We can see
related changes that hardly go hand in hand with a progressive rights narrative about
Communism’s collapse. Instead, immediately after that event we would see the effects of
an unbridled open market and a new harshness in the current(?) economic situation, i.e.,
a spike in income disparities as Piketty has documented. This has also become true of
highly developed industrialized countries such as the U.S. which is experiencing a new
‘Gilded Age’. We are now living with the very real consequences of these ongoing discoveries
of the dark side of globalization.
Yet, to what extent is the absence of market regulation occasioned by human rights?
This latest claim seems an iteration of the critique of human rights as a bourgeois distraction
based on Karl Marx in On the Jewish Question (1844). Moyn seems to be the most recent
advocate for this position, arguing that the deployment of human rights discourse is
somehow apposite to political mobilization, though as mentioned supra, some versions
of the critique also appear to reiterate political opposition to human rights by right wing
populists.
It is hard to understand this point in the abstract: why should these rights be
dichotomous everywhere? Instead one can see a contextual aspect to all of this and to the
relative significance say of property rights worldwide. Just to illustrate, to return to the
post-Cold War period and the rise of neo-liberalism: in great part, the initial reforms
constituted a reaction in the East to controlled economies and deprivations of personal

19

T. Piketty, Capital in the 21st Century. Cambridge, Mass. (2016).
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liberties. In this regard one might contrast the post-Communist constitutions and their
elevation of personal property rights20 with that of post-apartheid South Africa or
post-military junta Americas which had failed to do so. Instead, in these latter cases one
can see a broad understanding of international human rights entrenched in the
constitutions. The point here is that there is no necessary antinomy or contradiction that
pits human rights protections against economic equality: in many places, particularly the
former Soviet bloc, this framing just reiterates choices coming out of Communist
experiments and controlled economies. Moreover, many societies where political freedoms
are in short supply are also among those with very high economic disparities (e.g., Saudi
Arabia), providing further indicia that these are not in any necessary or logical tension.
In fact, in the Arab Spring, the human rights discourse was deployed as offering a
mobilization language for demand against corruption and for accountability.

4.2

The Challenge to Human Rights as Legal and Political and Not Social
or Economic

Despite the above, there has been a slow response on the part of rights activists who for
historical reasons have tended to privilege political over economic rights, often with a
stated concern for positivist modes of enforcement, etc. This in great part relates to the
extremes associated with the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa.
Yet, there is nothing intrinsic to the notion of human rights values that is in opposition
to economic justice. Indeed, these rights are articulated in the Universal Declaration together
since the postwar normative developments – a well-documented point21 conceded by Moyn
in his latest book Not Enough (2018). These are also set out in one of the two leading
covenants, the Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, where they were bifurcated not
for normative reasons, but due to political divisions associated with the Cold War at the
time. Indeed, as will be discussed in the next part below, even if civil and political human
rights seem to be facing impasses at the moment in some respects, there has been a
renaissance of the Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, as it is increasingly deployed
in debates over globalization, the Washington Consensus and so on, as a normative
counter-narrative to neoliberalism. Moreover, the so-called ‘Millennium Development
Goals’ and the more recent ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ adopted at the United Nations
have also become markers for basic development over the last decade.
There is an emerging local critique, whereby ‘human rights’ is characterized as a
language of law as opposed to politics, and relatedly one which has become part of the
20
21

See R. G. Teitel, ‘Paradoxes in the Revolution of the Rule of Law’, 19 Yale Journal of International Law. 239.
(1994); R. G. Teitel, Transitional Justice, Oxford. (2000).
See R. G. Teitel, ‘Human Rights Genealogy’, 66 Fordham Law Review. 301. (1997).
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daily workings of the UN and EU bureaucracies, as well as the norms that are at the center
of the regional human rights courts. It is of course true that states entering European
regional organizations had to adhere to a certain understanding of European rights as well
as to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, a regional enforcing body.
It may seem peculiar that institutions that historically have been associated with political
struggle and the attempt to cabin the state modeled on domestic constitutionalism now
likewise have come to be targets of the challenges to globalization, so that ‘human rights’
have become the most outward sign of the fact of transnational norms, and resented by
some for that very reason. Indeed, one can see that the very idea of human rights has
become nubs of contestation. This is particularly so where one might see human rights
actors or practices that appear to challenge sovereignty in ways that trigger nationalist
responses.

4.3

The Challenge to Human Rights as a Universalizing and Secular
Morality

The nationalist criticism is an overstated and historically inaccurate understanding of the
derivation of humanity norms. For a long time, we have seen that advocates of ‘rights talk’
such as Kathryn Sikkink or Aryeh Neier characterize human rights as ‘trumps’, e.g., human
rights as a sort of an ‘uber morality’, a conversation stopper. These advocates would fathom
the ‘rights as religion’ view of the human rights regime and its discourse. This challenge
has become more acute with more recent invocations of humanitarianism.
But putting it this way departs from principles of interpretation underlying international
rule of law. Reflecting on their historical role, human rights are best understood as building
blocks of liberal democracies and not as a singular source for the human rights regime
that has long competed with other forms of morality. The real question is: what are our
expectations of the positive norms? In looking at functions of human rights below we see
a particular kind of legal discourse: neither purely epiphenomenal, nor a higher moral law
or liberal theology. It is one that is predicated on deliberation and choice, not the opposite
of faith.
Human rights are bound to be part of ongoing dialogue, sometimes constructive
engagement, sometimes bitter struggle, between reason and revelation, modernity and
tradition. The vocabulary itself, with its ideas of limits to rights, of conflicts surrounding
rights-rights tradeoffs, margin of appreciation etc. can accommodate such dialogue. Indeed,
it is worth remembering that it accommodated earlier challenges of cultural relativism,
with potential reservations, and competing understandings with the tools of interpretation
and fragmentation of the international legal regime.
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Perhaps the French secularist tradition must be set against greater appreciation of some
of the religious sources of human rights, like the Jewish narrative of the people’s liberation
from slavery, the Christian narrative of the equality of all human beings before god, the
Islamic narrative of the universal just city (Al Farabi, ca. 870(?)–950). Consider how deeply
Martin Luther King’s discourse of civil rights is permeated with the Bible. In the US civil
rights tradition has evolved side by side with the progressive churches.22

4.4

Revisiting the ‘Endist’ Account

These developments relate to the debate in the human rights community about whether
we are indeed living through yet another cycle of so-called ‘endism’, discussed above.
Debates about the meaning of post-1989 continue to be vital in more than one circle which
seem to inform the interpretation of the current status of the human rights regime. For
more than one reason it seems that the critique enshrines the post-1989 period as the
Human Rights Moment. The question is why and whether this makes sense as a parameter
by which to judge the regime today?
In both political debates and scholarly writing, one can see a recurring series of
references which on the surface hark back to the post-Cold War moment. Indeed, one can
say that the end of the Cold War launched this period of intense political transition. One
recalls Francis Fukuyama and his notorious essay and subsequent book, which not only
took the Soviet collapse as a harbinger of liberalism’s final triumph, but also presumed a
path of linear progressivism, arguing that the engine of history depended on a political
dialectic which appeared to have vanished post-1989. Yugoslavia manifested how in the
absence of political control the existing forces unleash ethnic conflict. Here, human rights
campaigns played a direct role, hence for some, like Michael Ignatieff, there was a heady
sense of linear progression projected at the time. Of course, we would later see this as too
facile, and that the forces of ‘endism’ had not seen or could not anticipate that – no matter
the liberating political changes – simply opening borders and markets would have also
illiberal effects. Fukuyama did also predict some backlash from discontents with a liberalized
pacified world: Many found it boring or meaningless to exist in a world of ‘men without
chests’. We are now seeing the full brunt of this.
Indeed, recalling the phenomenon of the post-Cold War Human Rights moment might
well pave the way for a better understanding of our present moment. Just what does it
mean that ‘endism’ is rearing its head in recent years? Somehow this is a wrongheaded
interpretation of the status of human rights today. One thing is clear: it is not the end of
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the discourse of human rights. Tout au contraire: we can see that in the current moment
human rights’ normativity seems to offer a galvanizing basis of attack in many illiberal
states.
The above leads us to have to think critically about the notion of a coherent standard
of judgment of human rights in the world. We should acknowledge the close association
of current human rights narratives with distinct practices. So, for example, a number of
contemporary human rights accounts, namely, Moyn, Sikkink and Hopgood tell their
human rights stories as starting in the 1970s, focusing on human rights activism which is
associated with particular actors and advocacy. Yet, this focus is remarkably short, it
emphasizes practices and actors associated with this period, and is largely focused on South
American activists and associated with Cold War struggles.
Yet, there are alternative human rights narratives associated with other timelines e.g.
the post-war period as a starting point, the post-Nuremberg humanity mentality, followed
by the post-1945 Cold War divide between the West and the East and the role of human
rights (civil and political, social and economic) in Soviet countries, or the rise of US
promoting human rights Europe.23 There are still other historical starting points associated
with prior political conflicts and galvanizing moments, such as Grotius’ idea of humanity
in response to the Religious Wars.
Indubitably, each of these disparate historical starting points produces its own historical
narrative. And, in turn, each of these human rights narratives is associated with different
practices. Therefore, in a purely descriptive way, where those practices change or even the
same kinds of practices have different meanings, the limits of a master narrative, as it were,
become apparent. Here, methodologically one might think of Foucault’s or Nietzsche’s
accounts of genealogy. Consider in this regard the framing in Moyn’s The Last Utopia
arguing that human rights is a utopian project with a limited trajectory. Or, consider
Hopgood’s The Endtimes of Human Rights.24 Like Moyn, whose subject is the historical
role of human rights activism, Hopgood also diagnoses its demise based on a falling off of
certain activist practices. Likewise consider the formulation in challenges posed by political
scientists Snyder and Vinjamuri’s questioning the way forward in Human Rights Futures.25
Recalling the fate of post-Cold War ‘endism’ – to what extent it is signaling a new
political phase – might well pave the way for understanding of our present moment better.
Just what does it mean that ‘endism’ is rearing its head in recent years? Consider other
‘endist’ tracts, such as Edward Luce’s The Retreat of Western Liberalism which looks to the
rise of illiberal populism and the fate of several democracies to draw our attention to
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growing vulnerabilities relating to economic scarcity and a related loss of liberal democratic
consensus.26 Luce’s intent seems above all to sound an alarm bell, before it is ‘too late’ for
liberal democracy, even if at times he seems thoroughly pessimistic. Or, consider Richard
Haass’ A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order
discussing the new chaos occasioned by loss of stable regionalism throughout the world.27
Some chapters in this volume reflect on the further chipping away of rules-based orders.
In sum, while one cannot do justice to all of these developments, we should consider
seriously the direction of this scholarship over the last decade. Critical scholarship about
human rights has now expanded into broader statements about deterioration in liberalism
and the decay of democracy. This points to a signaling function of human rights and to
the broader significance of developments taken up in this volume.

5

The Ongoing Relevance of Humanity Law

Now let us turn to what is currently understood by the human rights regime and its
relationship with the humanitarian regime. It may be useful to begin by addressing a wide
range of understandings over its uses, that is the contestation over what counts as human
rights discourse. One might imagine that the difference in what is considered as relevant
phenomena will have an impact on understandings of genealogy, relevant actors,
institutions, enforcement practices, inter alia, as well as likely future trajectories.
Here I would like to re-situate and re-interpret the current account of a human rights
regime in decline, and instead interpret the status of human rights in the contemporary
political and economic context characterized by political, economic and legal globalization.
Here we need to recognize that we are in a ‘beyond the state’ situation, one which in some
regard underscores the core human rights message, while at the same time, rendering it
harder to operationalize (i.e., to apply and enforce).
In the current political context, the traditional human rights paradigm, which was
patterned on constitutionalism and related constitutional rights ratified and enforced
within the state – has had to yield to other approaches. This presents challenges for
conceptualizing the role of human rights and defining and measuring compliance. Some
analysts emphasize positivism in human rights and the associated practice of the related
measure of compliance. Consider Sikkink versus Posner in this regard,28 or consider Yuval
Shany’s pragmatic view of human rights compliance as a form of human rights
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pragmatism,”29 which he explains as a regime or rule of law which has to be seen in light
of and in a sense relativized by other norms.30 Beyond compliance, the discussion goes to
how to grasp or fathom the complex impact of international human rights norms on the
world, once we see that the impact is not exhausted by and may not be even be typified by
a state’s self-conscious or explicit compliance with specific positive rules of international
human rights.
But the problem of practices of compliance is deep; the very measure of compliance
assumes state capacity whereas many of the territorial constellations with the worst human
rights records lack such state institutions and therefore means of rights enforcement. At
present, with weak and failed states, this problem has become further aggravated. Therefore,
it is precisely in the current context of globalization that we can see struggle over both how
to obtain human rights enforcement and how to measure or evaluate it. Not surprisingly
in such a context, the singular emphasis on state-based compliance simply misses a lot of
the phenomena first off, as it understates compliance as being just about the state, whereas
rights are reflected via social constructivism, involving a set of diverse actors and their
array of interests.31
Once we let in the ‘beyond the state’ character of human rights enforcement today,
real world effects result from changing the understanding and self-understanding of
non-state actors, even if state ‘compliance’ may be low or just hard to measure. If all one
studied are limited practices of state behavior, then the political developments above appear
to reflect lower state compliance and a waning in international rights law uses. But this
approach misses a lot of the phenomena. Inadequate for understanding international
legality’s normative effects, it oversimplifies if not distorts the relationship of international
law to politics.
Moreover, ‘compliance’ studies tend to abstract from the problem of interpretation.
Interpretation is determinative of what happens to legal rules in the real world, though
outside of the law this is often not well understood. We can see particularly in a moment
of extreme fragmentation of legal orders – such as we currently have – the significance
and indeed demand for interpretation in response to the problems and to the messiness
of legal globalization. To begin, consider that human rights is a discourse associated with
secularism, universalizability, rationalism and legality. This itself defines in a way for whom
and in what situations it can be empowering and constructive of individual and collective
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identity, as well indeed as for whom human rights will be seen or can be made to be seen
as an ‘enemy’.
What is the function of this specific legal discourse? What is its subject? Its distinct
practices? Its normativity? I aimed to show that we were in a distinct context. Post-Arab
Spring and amidst recent shifts in globalization with its political and economic challenges
a shift in human rights discourse has occurred, which I have called humanity-law, arguing
that there had been fundamental changes in the subject and aegis of human rights law.
Where there were increasing numbers of sites of pervasive violence, a hybrid legal regime
emerged which addresses both war and peace via human rights and humanitarian law.
This hybrid regime addresses both state and non-state actors, an important feature of
globalization via international humanitarian law. Finally, rights enforcement through
international humanitarian law aims both individually and collectively to protect the rights
of persons in armed combat.
Equipped with this added interpretive lens, one might re-consider the role of human
rights today by looking at the how and where human rights demand discourse and how
and where human rights practices are used effectively. Therefore, I now turn to consider
the role of human rights today by looking at when, in what contexts, and how the discourse
and practices are being used most effectively as a source of resistance and liberalization.
A closer look should illuminate an array of roles for the human rights regime, discourse
and practices, and related values and norms used in weak democracies, in transitions, and
beyond. It also reveals the connections between human rights and humanity-based legal
norms more generally.

6

6.1

Human Rights and Normative Gap Filling

Human Rights Informing Domestic Constitutionalism

One might begin with the unseen obvious: there is a regular use of international human
rights norms even in established democracies for gap filling where due to a particular
culture, religions, etc., there remain normative gaps in the domestic constitutional scheme.32
Consider, for example, in this regard, Lawrence v. Texas where the US Supreme Court
overturned its earlier ruling relying in part on international human rights law and European
Court of Human Rights case law in order to close a gap relating to privacy and due process
rights, thus, contributing normative support to the decriminalization of gay sex in a
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constitutional case on appeal from Texas.33 Likewise, one can see the uses of international
human rights norms informing the area of death penalty litigation reflecting interaction
of human rights with domestic constitutionalism.34 Areas as diverse as counter-terror and
even affirmative action decisions have been informed by international conventions and
consensus.35
In another region, consider the challenges to abortion rights in number of Latin
American countries also drawing on international human rights instruments. There have
been mass mobilizations for women’s reproductive rights grounded in human rights
normativity. Similarly, in post-Communist countries, where with the rise of traditional
religion which had been long suppressed, such as in Poland, there is an ongoing political
struggle over reproductive rights. Articulating the struggle for reproductive rights in rights
terms has been a source for political mobilization also in Ireland.
Another often related political context where we have seen a significant ongoing interest
in the uses of discourse of human rights is the post-transition moment. Here too one can
see the functions of international human rights: this regime informs and lays the basis for
domestic constitutionalism. Consider for example post-apartheid South Africa and its
Interim Constitution and the extent to which its conception of domestic constitutional
rights was informed and shaped by international human rights instruments. This is also
true throughout Latin America where many countries explicitly reference international
law as a source of higher constitutional norms.36

6.2

Human Rights as Countervailing Discourse in Political Mobilization
in the Pre-Transitional Context

Another context which illustrates functions of human rights as an alternative discourse
to deploy is in resistance to repression – one might say pre-transition – where invoking
human rights values offers a source of countervailing moral authority.
For a Cold War example, consider the Helsinki Accords campaign and its impact within
the Eastern Bloc. No one expected communist countries to comply fully with the Accords,
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as that would have entailed regime change. Nevertheless, establishment of the norms as
fully ‘universal’ constituted a source of solidarity and support for resistance and dissent,
a valuable and admirable function, even if the end of the Cold War seemed distant or
perhaps ever distant. Consider the direct relationship between Helsinki, Charter 77 and
the emergence of the Civic Forum in the former Czechoslovakia. Relatedly, one could see
in the Arab Spring the destabilizing role of claims of rights on the cusp of economic and
political rights against corruption and to rule of law.37

6.3

Human Rights as Process

There are recent instances where we see a role for international human rights in contributing
to the rules of the game in political transition. We see parties binding themselves via human
rights rules. Consider Colombia’s recent peace process and agreement.38 In this regard,
one thinks of the late jurist scholar Carlos Nino’s view of democracy in terms of
deliberation,39 and relatedly the uses of the Argentine trials to open up hitherto closed
decision-making processes.40 The context is fairly recent. Where there is political change
underway, but where no common script exists, often we see that the rights at issue are
largely procedural.

6.4

Human Rights as Human Security in the Context of Economic
Globalization

In the last ten years, we have seen the ways in which the human rights regime can provide
a discourse and normativity that can be very helpful in times of unregulated economic
globalization. Indeed, here we see the move to ‘humanity law’ and demands for human
security whether in conflict or peacetime.41
In the post-Cold War context we began to see a move away from purely political rights
to social and economic rights. This is indeed not surprising, given the Cold War, i.e., the
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political contingency of the ‘divide’.42 In recent decades, there has been an important
encounter between the human rights regime, especially the part of it that concerned
economic and social rights and neoliberal globalization, which Rob Howse and I call
‘Beyond the Divide’.43 At a time of economic deregulation, and financial crisis and greater
vulnerabilities, we can see an upsurge in references to ‘the right to health’ and ‘right to
work’ set out in the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.44 It is clear that,
in particular, realizing rights to food and to health (access to medicine) raise important
issues regarding trade policies confronted by the WTO.45
Indeed, there is a movement right now towards framing the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) in terms of economic, social and cultural rights.46 This can be seen in the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development47 which makes clear links to international
human rights law, envisaging “a world of universal respect for human rights and human
dignity, the rule of law, justice, equality and non-discrimination.” This rights framing
offers a direction for follow-up and review processes, which will be “participatory and
rights-based” and will “benefit from the active support of the United Nations system.” The
current thinking is that by linking these together more systematically in their work, UN
human rights mechanisms contribute to accountability in realizing these goals and the
broader economic, social and cultural rights.
One can see the growing usefulness of these concepts in the political arena as well. Both
in the UK with debates around Brexit centering on health insurance guarantees and likewise
in the US, the notion of a ‘right to health’ played an important role during the last election
in galvanizing progressive politics and one can see that this idea is gaining ever greater
political traction. International human rights protections can be a counterweight to the
problem of economic downturn and precarity which for many has been associated with
globalization. The rights regime enables disaggregating health and other benefits from
employment which for many has become increasingly precarious. Relatedly, we can see
the development of a concept of ‘human security’.48
In civil society, as well, one can see newfound political mobilization relating to economic,
social and cultural rights. There are political movements today relying on equality rights
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and equal treatment regarding work on a rights basis. See, e.g., the rise of ‘Women’s
Marches’, the revival of the Equal Rights Amendment, concerning equality of pay and
equal treatment at work.

6.5

Other Forms of Human Security: Human Rights in the Context of
Humanitarian Intervention

What role for human rights in conflict? One of the oldest areas of normativity is
international humanitarian law which plays an important role in closing gaps between
plain disorder and other conflict. Addressing cleavages in humanitarian law on the
continuum between interstate conflict, traditional war, internal conflict, and other
situations, civil disorder, occupation, emergency, where today we see very difficult, perhaps
impossible, efforts to apply the humanitarian regime as a self-contained regime or code.
Consider the security issues in Israel and Palestine, and just how difficult it is to make the
jus in bello regime work as a self-contained regime given contemporary realities.
Often this use of human rights and humanitarianism is characterized as a latter-day
development, as one somehow starting with the Bosnia conflict and then ratified in R2P
(and then misapplied in Libya).49 The historical principle seems to still be current although
there was a lot of debate following Libya as the notion that started as humanitarian
intervention ended in full-fledged ‘regime change’. Furthermore, we continue to see rare
instances of outside intervention justified in terms of human rights. Consider Obama’s
statement regarding the so-called ‘red line’ in Syria.50
Yet, the preoccupation goes back to the very beginnings of the history and
conceptualization of international law. It is a normative delimiting of the interstate system.
The concern relates to the most longstanding conceptions of the significance of human
rights values, dating back to the 17th century Grotian position (of humanitarian
intervention.)51 Hence one can trace a longstanding historical concern, and yet also
persistent difficulties in implementation.
With respect to the question of ‘human rights as humanitarian intervention’ there has
been significant learning from the 1990s, as seen in the subsequent institutional
development in terms of R2P’s structure at a time of globalizing human rights which
incorporate a key global guiding principle: the” principle of complementarity” which is
predicated on a layered approach where the local and regional are prior to global
intervention. Indeed, in one region (Europe), there has been a call for a collective human
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rights-based military policy.52 One can see this as well in other regions. The point is that
there is now a more nuanced understanding of legal and military engagement in a global
context in which human rights continue to play a significant role.

7

Conclusion

Globalization pressures have effected changes in the relevant actors and institutions
operating in the human rights field. There are pressures on prevailing practices in human
rights which may well be related to prior political contexts and needs. Hence, we need to
identify changes in the relevant subjects, institutions and actors. As a general matter, one
sees a turn away from inward-looking institutions and NGOs with predetermined agendas
to more decentralized actors, global civil society, social media. According to some, these
changes might be seen as a retrenchment. Yet, in some contexts one might interpret this
also a salutary move away from institutionalization and commodification of human rights
to more local and less institutionalized – more dynamic – forms of activism. In a sense,
one might characterize this as returning the human to human rights.53

52

53

See D. Rodin, Ask Reddit-Thread. Available at https://www.reddit.com/r/changemyview/comments/8ta2fw/
cmvthe_european_union_should make_international/, where he argues that the EU should make human
rights the basis for all use of military force by member states.
See I. Rangelov & R. G. Teitel, ‘Global Civil Society and Transitional Justice’, in H. Anheier, M. Glasius,
M. Kaldor, G.S. Park & C. Sengupta (eds.), Global Civil Society 2011: Global Civil Society Yearbook. London.
(2011).

132

